

POLS5363-001 International Organization
Fall 2014
Department of Political Science, Texas Tech University
W 3:00-5:50 PM in Holden Hall 107

This syllabus contains the policies and expectations I have established for POLS5363: International Organization. Please read the entire syllabus carefully before continuing in this course.

1 Instructor Information

Dr. Carie Steele

Email: carie.steele@ttu.edu

Phone: 834-2195

Office: Holden Hall 15

Office Hours: M 8-11AM and by apt.

2 Course Overview and Objectives

This is an advanced seminar, designed for Ph.D. students who are assumed to have already taken an introductory-level course in international relations. We will engage in a broad survey of the field, focusing on recent developments in international relations theory, international institutions, regimes, and formal organizations. The course will be theory-driven. Early weeks will focus on theoretical frameworks used to understand international cooperation and the formation of institutions. Later weeks will focus on empirical applications of these theories to specific issue areas, including trade, international monetary policy, environmental issues, and human rights.

2.1 Course Objectives

1. Summarize and explain the fundamental elements of theories of cooperation and international institutions.
2. Critically assess theoretical arguments within the international organization literature.
3. Critique and evaluate empirical studies of international cooperation and international institutions.
4. Generate research questions, testable hypotheses, and appropriate tests related to international organization.

3 Required Readings

The following books we will read in part or in whole. I suggest buying them, but ultimately, it is your choice. They are available on Amazon, most are available used, and are generally cheap.

- Axelrod, Robert. (1980) *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books.
- Hawkins, Darren, David Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael Tierney. (2006) *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. (1984) *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Milner, Helen. (1997) *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ostrom, Elinor. (1990) *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tomz, Michael. (2007) *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Additional readings are available online through TTU journal subscriptions, or, for book chapters or articles that are not unavailable online, I will provide scanned copies on Blackboard.

4 Course Structure

This course will meet weekly and be conducted as a seminar, with discussions initiated and led by students. You are expected to raise questions, draw connections to other readings (including across weeks), and provide evaluation and critique. Course assignments are designed to incentivize participation and engagement.

4.1 Grading

Students will be evaluated on the following materials:

Assignment	Percentage
Class Participation:	25%
Discussion Leader and Agenda:	25%
Writing Assignment(s):	50%

Assignments will be graded with a check minus, check, or check plus. These correspond with an ordinal scale of unacceptable, acceptable, and outstanding.

4.2 Assignments and Evaluations

Participation

Active participation is an essential piece of any graduate education and essential for a successful seminar. You are expected to attend and participate in every class meeting. During seminar, we will review and discuss each of the assigned readings. The direction and quality of the discussion will rely heavily upon your contributions. Although being able to summarize the article is important, you are also expected to raise substantive and theoretical question, draw connections to other readings/literatures, and provide critical assessment of the readings. This requires that all class members have completed all of the assigned readings for each class. Weak participation, especially due to failure to read the assigned materials will be punished appropriately.

Discussion Leader and Agenda

Students will select three weeks during the semester when they will act as discussion leader. On weeks that you are discussion leader, you will have greater responsibility to lead and facilitate discussion. You should be prepared, not only to summarize information from the article, but also be able to identify key issues or ideas of interest and develop relevant, discussion stimulating questions. Please note that on weeks when you are not discussion leader you are still expected to

complete the readings and participate in discussion. You will sign-up for the weeks you wish to serve as discussion leader during the first class. You have some freedom in your selection, but each week must have at least one discussion leader.

When you serve as discussion leader, you are also required to submit a 1-3 page agenda for that week's meeting. Think of this as an outline of your plan for leading discussion. An agenda requires you structure discussion, including what order the readings should be discussed in, how and what to review in each article to ensure everyone in the class has understood the reading, and questions that encourage discussion about key ideas and themes. Your goal is to prepare to lead an outstanding discussion of the readings. The best discussions generally result in discussion about research ideas. Agendas are due to me **before** class the day that you are discussion leader. I will make copies and distribute them in class. If multiple people are signed up for the same week, you may coordinate discussion leader duties (e.g. split up the readings and each leader is responsible structuring only their reading), but your group must produce a single agenda and you are still expected to draw connections across readings.

Writing Assignments

You have two options for the primary writing product for this course — six research proposals, or one submission-ready article manuscript. You must notify of your choice in class on September 10th.

1. **Research proposals:** Research proposals are 4-6 page papers in which you present and original research question and theoretical story related to that week's topic. Think about these proposals as writing the front end of a research paper. An acceptable proposal will include an original research question and discussion of the puzzle that motivates it, as well as a corresponding theoretical story, and logically derived propositions. Outstanding proposals will give particular attention to specifying causal mechanisms within the theory, situating the research proposal within the existing literature, and identifying the theoretical contribution. It may prove useful to start with and include a box and arrow chart of your theory. Not only will this assist you in thinking through causal mechanisms, it will also help your reader visualize your theory. **Please note: These papers are not literature reviews or summaries of the readings. A cursory review of literature that is relevant to the development of your theory is necessary and expected, but the majority of the paper should be discussion about your theory and contribution, not a summary of others' contributions. In addition, your proposals should not include discussion of operationalization, measurement, data, or analyses.**

These proposals can address big picture questions in new ways or build off of current work in an incremental fashion. However, it is important to note that the assignment requires a theoretical contribution. It is not appropriate to simply identify an alternative or missing variable in current work without developing a strong theoretical story, identifying causal mechanisms, and deriving logical propositions. Your theoretical contribution will be the primary determinant of your grade of each proposal. Proposals that earn a check plus indicates that I judge worthy of further research.

If you select the research proposal option, you will complete 6 research proposals during the course of the semester. You can write on more than 6 if you choose, and I will take your 6 best grades. For topics that you choose to write a research proposal for, you should submit a draft of the proposal to me prior to class. I will reserve time at the end of class during which,

each student who wrote a proposal will present a brief summary of their question and theory. We will discuss each proposal and then students will have two days to revise based upon this discussion. Final drafts of proposals are due on Friday by 6pm. Although you have some freedom to choose topics that most interest you, you may not let three weeks pass between submitting proposals.

2. **Submission-ready article manuscript:** In lieu of the research proposals, you also have the option of submitting a submission-ready, IO related research paper. This means that the manuscript represents a research question and theoretical contribution worthy of publication in a middle tier subfield journal, includes an appropriate research design that has been executed well, has been edited and polished, and could reasonably be submitted for review as is. This option is only appropriate for PhD students producing IO related work for publication or for their dissertations. In addition, because of the high expectations and the necessity for a completion of data collection and analyses, this option should only be selected if you already have a fully formed research idea and have verified the availability of necessary data.

If you would like to choose this option, you will need to schedule a meeting with me on or before September 10th so that we can discuss your research project. During this meeting, you should be able to provide a clear research question, discuss your theory and research design, and identify appropriate data. It will also be necessary to meet with me several times throughout the semester to discuss your progress.

Your manuscript will be treated as a journal submission. Feedback will be given in the form of a journal review. Grades will correspond to the usual reviewer recommendations — “Accept” will be equivalent to a high A, “Revise and Resubmit (minor revisions)” to a low A, “Revise and Resubmit (major revisions)” to a B, and “Reject” to a C.

5 Course Policies

5.1 Classroom Etiquette

In order to create a classroom environment that is conducive to learning, you are expected to adhere to basic classroom etiquette. Do not disrupt class. This includes arriving late, leaving early, holding side conversations with others, reading newspapers, and using electronic devices in a distracting manner. Do not interrupt or engage in side conversations while someone else is speaking. Be civil, constructive, and respectful — derogatory and sarcastic comments have no place in the classroom. Comments that are derogatory toward any group — particularly on the basis of race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or disability — are strictly prohibited. I reserve the right to ask you to leave the classroom if you are disrupting or obstructing normal class functions.

5.2 Religious Observances

Texas House Bill 256 regarding religious observances requires that faculty and the university make every effort to reasonably and fairly deal with all students who, because of religious obligations, have conflicts with scheduled exams, assignments or required attendance. Students are advised to notify the course instructor well in advance of the conflict and must submit documentation in order to make-up the missed assignment within two weeks of the original due date.

5.3 University Policy Regarding Students with Disabilities

Any student who, because of a disability, may require special arrangements in order to meet the course requirements should contact the instructor within the first two weeks of class to make any necessary arrangements. Official university documentation regarding disabilities will be required. Please note instructors are not allowed to provide classroom accommodations to a student until appropriate verification from Student Disability Services has been provided. For additional information consult Student Disability Services: <http://www.depts.ttu.edu/studentaffairs/sds/>

5.4 Academic Dishonesty Policy:

According to the Texas Tech Student Handbook: “Academic dishonesty” includes, but is not limited to, cheating, plagiarism, collusion, falsifying academic records, misrepresenting facts, and any act designed to give unfair academic advantage to the student (such as, but not limited to, submission of essentially the same written assignment for two courses without the prior permission of the instructor) or the attempt to commit such an act.

Any such act will not be tolerated in this class. Any student caught plagiarizing work will be given a failing grade for the course and reported to University officials for possible expulsion from the University. Additional information on TTU’s policy concerning academic dishonesty can be found at <http://www.depts.ttu.edu/studentjudicialprograms/AcademicIntegrity.htm>

6 Course Schedule

Week	Topic and Readings
Week 1 - Aug. 27	Introduction to Course Review Syllabus and Course Expectations
Week 2 - Sept 3	Why Cooperate? Axelrod, Robert. (1984). <i>The Evolution of Cooperation</i> . New York: Basic Books. Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. <i>Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions</i> . New York: W.W. Norton and Company, chapters 8, 9, & 10 Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” <i>Science</i> 162 (3859): 1243-1248 The Debate About Cooperation Mearsheimer, John J. (1995). “The False Promise of International Institutions.” <i>International Security</i> 19(3):5-49. Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa Martin. (1995) “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory.” <i>International Security</i> 20(1): 39-51.
Week 3 - Sept 10	Cooperation and Institutions

Keohane, Robert O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-6

Martin, Lisa L. (1992) "Interests, Power and Multilateralism." *International Organization*. 46(4):765-92

Morrow, James. (1994). "Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information". *International Organization* 48(3):387-423.

Abbot, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. (1998) "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 42(1):3-32.

Milrogn, Paul R. et al. (1990) "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs". *Economics and Politics*. 2(1).

Week 4 - Sept 17

Institutional Design

Ostrom, Elinor. (1990). *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Mitchell, Ronald. (1994). "Regime Design Matters: International Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance". *International Organization* 48:3: 425-458.

Stone, Randall W., et al. (2008). "Choosing How to Cooperate". *International Studies Quarterly*. 52(2)335-362.

Koremenos, Babara, et al. (2001). "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* 55(4):761-799.

Week 5 - Sept 24

Institutional Design

Koremenos, Barbara. (2005). "Contracting around International Uncertainty." *American Political Science Review*. 99(4):549-65.

Downs, George W., et al. (1998) "Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism". *International Organization*. 52(2):397-419.

Gilligan, Michael J. (2004) "Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements?" *International Organization* 58(3):459-484.

Kucik, Jeffrey and Eric Reinhardt. (2008) "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime". *International Organization*. 62(3):477-505.

Copelovitch, Mark, and Tonya Putnam. (2014). "Design in Context: Existing International Agreements and New Cooperation". *International Organization* 68(2):471-493.

Week 6 - Oct 1**Delegation and International Cooperation**

Hawkins, Darren, et al. (2006) *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations* New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 4, 7, 12

Vaubel, Roland. (2006) "Principal-agent problems in International Organizations". *Review of International Organizations* 1:125-138.

Fang, Songying and Randal Stone. (2012) "International Organizations as Policy Advisors". *International Organization* 66(4): 537-569.

Week 7 - Oct 8**Reputation and Cooperation**

Tomz, Michael. (2007) *Reputation and International Cooperation*. Princeton. Princeton University Press.

Downs, George W., and Michael A. Jones. (2002) "Reputation, Compliance and International Law", *Journal of Legal Studies*. 31(Jan): S98-S114.

Lebovic, James and Eric Voeten. (2006) "The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR", *International Studies Quarterly* 50(4):861-888.

Week 8 - Oct 15**No Class****Week 9 - Oct 22****Domestic Politics and International Cooperation**

Milner, Helen V. (1997) *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-5.

Finnemore, Martha. (1996) *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapter 1

Lohmann, Susanne. (2003) "Why Do Institutions Matter? An Audience-Cost Theory of Institutional Commitment". *Governance* 16(1):95-110.

Wallace, Geoffrey P.R. (2013) "International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture: An Experimental Study". *International Organization* 67(1):105-140.

Dai, Xinyuan. (2005) "Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism". *International Organization* 59(2): 363-98.

Week 10 - Oct 29**Effectiveness of International Institutions**

Gutner, Tamar and Alexander Thompson. (2010) "The Politics of IO Performance: A Framework". *Review of International Organizations* 5(3): 227-248.

Von Stein, Jana. (2005) "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance". *American Political Science Review* 99(4): 611-622.

Lupu, Yonatan. (2013) "The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects". *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4):912-925.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel. (2007) "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements". *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 721-737.

Steinberg, Richard H. (2002) "In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO". *International Organization* 56(2):339-374.

Kelley, Judith (2007) "Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements". *American Political Science Review* 101(3):575-589.

Week 11 - Nov 5**International Trade and Cooperation**

Goldstein, et al. (2007) "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade". *International Organization* 61(4)

Subramanian, Arvind and Shang-Jin Wei. (2007) "The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly". *Journal of International Economics* 72(1):151-175.

Smith, James McCall. (2000) "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts". *International Organization* 54(1):137-180.

Rosendorff, Peter B. (2005) "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedure". *American Political Science Review* 99(3):389-400.

Busch, Marc L. and Eric Reinhardt. (2006) "Three's a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement". *World Politics* 58(3): 46-77

Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett, and Christina Davis. (2009) "Who Files? Developing Country Participation in WTO Adjudication". *Journal of Politics* 71(3):1033-1049.

Week 12 - Nov 12**International Monetary Relations and Finance**

Simmons, Beth A. (2002) "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs". *American Political Science Review* 94(4):819-835.

Oatley, Thomas and Robert Nabors. (1998) "Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord". *International Organization* 52(1):35-54.

Posner, Elliot. (2009) "Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at the Turn of the Millennium" *International Organization* 63(4):665-699.

Stone, Randall W. (2008) "The Scope of IMF Conditionality". *International Organization* 62(4):580-620.

Vreeland, James R. (2011) "Foreign Aid and Global Governance: Buying Bretton Woods — the Swiss Bloc Case". *Review of International Organizations* 6(3-4): 369-391.

Barro, Robert J. and Jong-Wha Lee. (2005) "IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What are the Effects?" *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52(7):1245-1269.

Week 13 - Nov 19**International Environmental Politics and Cooperation**

Mitchell, Ronald B. (2003) "International Environmental Agreements: A Survey of Their Features, Formation, and Effects". *Annual Review of Environmental Resources* 28:429-461.

Thompson, Alexander. (2006) "Management Under Anarchy: The International Politics of Climate Change". *Climate Change* 78(1):7-29.

Ringquist, Evan J. and Tatiana Kostadinova. (2005) "Assessing the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: The Case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol". *American Journal of Political Science* 49(1):86-102.

Prakash, Asseem, and Matthew Potoski. (2006) "Racing to the Bottom? Trade, Environmental Governance, and ISO 14001". *American Journal of Political Science* 50(2):350-364.

Bernauer, Thomas, et al. (2013) "Is There a 'Depth versus Participation' Dilemma in International Cooperation?" *Review of International Organizations* 8(4):477-497.

Battig, Michele B, and Thomas Bernauer. (2009) "National Institutions and Global Public Good: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy?" *International Organization* 55(4):291-308.

Week 14 - Nov 26

No Class — Thanksgiving Break

Week 15 - Dec. 3

Human Rights and International Cooperation

Morvcsik, Andrew. (2000) “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe”. *International Organization* 54(2):217-252.

Dai, Xinyuan. (2013) “The Conditional Effects of International Human Rights Institutions”. *Human Rights Quarterly*. 36(3):569-589.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie, et al. (2011). “Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties”. *International Organization* 65(4): 673-707.

Vreeland, James R. (2008) “Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture”. *International Organization* 62(1):65-101.

Hathawy, Oona A. (2002) “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” *Yale Law Journal* 111(8):1870.

7 Recommended Readings

Beck, Nathaniel (2010). "Causal Process 'Observation': Oxymoron or (Fine) Old Wine." *Political Analysis* 18(4): 499-505.

Brady, Henry E., and David Collier (2004). *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham. Rowman & Littlefield.

Broz, J. Lawrence. (1998) "The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem". *International Organization* 52(2):231-268.

Chapman, Terrence L. (2007) "International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(1): 134-166.

Collier, David, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright (2006). "Toward a Pluralistic Vision of Methods: Time to Move On." *Political Analysis* 18(4): 506-13.

Copelovitch, Mark S. (2010) "Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending". *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1):49-77.

Dam, Kenneth W. (2010) "The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and Comparative Perspectives". *Chicago Journal of International Law* 10(2):581-638.

Fang, Songying. (2008) "The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics". *American Journal Of Political Science* 52(2):304-321.

Fearon, James D. (1991). "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science." *World Politics* 43(2):169-95.

Gerring, John. (2004). "What is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?" *American Political Science Review* 98(2):341-54.

Gilligan, Michael J. and Leslie Johns. (2012). "Formal Models of International Institutions" *Annual Review of Political Science*. 15:221-43.

Gilligan, Michael J. (2008). "A defense of the Transactions Costs Approach to Understanding International Institutions." In *Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics*. Helen Milner and Andrew Morvcsik, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Grieco, Joseph M. (1988). "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." *International Organization*. 42(3):485-507.

Hurd, Ian. (1999). "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." *International Organization* 53(2): 379-408.

Jervis, Robert. (1978). "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 30(2): 167-214.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton. Princeton University Press. Chapter 3.

Lake, David A. (2007). "Escape form the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics." *International Security* 32(1):47-79.

Martin, Lisa L. and Beth A. Simmons (1998) "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." *International Organization* 52(4):729-757.

Mattes, Michaela (2012). "Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design." *International Organization* 66(4): 679-707.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* W.W. Norton Company Inc.

Moravcsik, Andrew. (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization*. 51(4): 513-553.

Neilson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney. (2003) "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform". *International Organization* 57(2):241-276.

Przeworski, Adam, and James R. Vreeland. (2000) "The Effect of IMF Programs in Economic Growth". *Journal of Development Economics* 62:385-421.

Raustiala, Kal. (1997) "Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory Cooperation: Comparative Response to the Convention on Biological Diversity". *World Politics* 49(4):482-509.

Rogowski, Ronald. (1995). "The Role of Theory and Anomaly in Social-Scientific Inference." *American Political Science Review* 89:2 467-470.

Sharman, J.C. (2009) "The Bark is the Bite: International Organizations and Blacklisting", *Review of International Political Economy* 16(4).

Simmons, Beth A. (1998) "Compliance with International Agreements". *Annual Review of Political Science* 1:75-93.

Stone, Randall W. (2009). "Institutions, Power, and Interdependence." In *Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors*. Helen V. Milner and Andrew Moravcsik eds. Princeton. Princeton University Press: 31-49.

Voeten, Erik. (2014) "Does Participation in International Organizations Increase Cooperation?". *Review of International Organizations* 9(3): 285-308.

Young, Oran R. (1989) *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment*. Cornell University Press.